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Originalism: Lessons from Things that
Go Without Saying†

ROBERT W. BENNETT*

It is a very special honor to present these Nathanson lectures, and not
simply for the obvious reason that I was asked to join a very
distinguished list of Nathanson lecturers. I also have fond recollections
of an earlier visit to the school—more than twenty-five years ago—and I
am an admirer of the work of several members of the San Diego faculty
that intersects in various ways with my own. But most of all, Nat
Nathanson, after whom the lectures are named, was a dear friend and
colleague at Northwestern—and also a hero of mine—for many years.
The colleague relationship spanned twenty-four years, and the friendship
came easily, and continues with Leah Nathanson who is well known to
you folks in San Diego, and who is here with us today. The hero business
perhaps requires a bit more explaining. Nat was generous with younger
colleagues like me, who were floundering around a bit, but very
demanding of himself. He insisted on confronting the hard questions
posed by positions that his instincts embraced. I watched that over the
years, and as a result, I try to resist sloughing over difficulties as I puzzle
through some problem. I do not think I satisfy the standard that Nat set,
but I have no doubt that it was his own standard of intellectual rigor that
helps me try. Indeed, Nat Nathanson remains such a part of my psychology

† Nathaniel L. Nathanson Memorial Lecture, University of San Diego Law
School, March 11, 2008.
* Nathaniel L. Nathanson Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of
Law. My thanks to Richard Weisberg, Michael Herz, and Andrew Koppelman for
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this lecture.
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that I was stunned to read in today’s program that he has been gone for
more years than he was my colleague.
That said, I think Nat would be impatient by now for me to get on to
my assigned task, and so without further ado, I turn to lessons for
originalism from some things that go without saying in and around the
United States Constitution.
What has come to be called “originalism” in constitutional interpretation
has shown remarkable resilience. Adherents to originalism are called
“originalists,” and some of the stick-to-itiveness is shown by originalists
in these very halls. I will have some critical things to say about
originalism in action, but I do not want to be misunderstood by my
gracious hosts. I do not come to bury originalism, but rather to set it free.
The word originalism, at least as often used by adherents, is just too
tendentious, suggesting that with historical work and some clear headed
thinking the Constitution can be mined for a lot of right answers to
today’s problems. The principal message I want to deliver today is that
any such claim is woefully exaggerated. The term interpretivism, first
coined by Tom Grey and then popularized by John Hart Ely, held sway
for a time.1 Then Paul Brest came up with originalism.2 Brest meant the
word only descriptively,3 and in my view we would have been better
served by resisting the neo-neologism with its normative connotations.
Still, I could live with originalism if adherents would only own up to the
very large degree of choice that necessarily exists in the arena of
constitutional interpretation. Like it or not, that means that if we retain
aggressive judicial review—and I see no signs of any contemplated
abandonment—judges will provide substantial input into the complex of
value choices that help define American public life.
Originalism, as I assume you all know, is the view that the appropriate
guideposts for constitutional interpretation are “original” ones, sources
that probe constitutional “meaning” by reference to the meaning
entertained by the people around at the time the Constitution was
enacted. The resilience of the approach is remarkable in part because
intractable puzzles just keep coming about what originalists mean by
meaning.

1. See John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility,
53 IND. L.J. 399, 399–400 (1978); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1–4
(1980); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 705–06 (1975).
2. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.
L. REV. 204, 204 n.1 (1980).
3. Id.
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One set of problems has been front and center. There were a lot of
people around at the time the Constitution was formulated and adopted,
and originalists have visibly struggled with the question of which among
them counts in fathoming meaning. One category of candidates is the
authors of the Constitution, suggested by talk of “original intention.”4
Then there is the initial audience for the document, suggested by talk of
“original understanding.” But there are questions of who plays those
roles. Are state ratifying conventions, for instance, authors or audience?5
And then, more recently ascendant has been talk of “original meaning”
which, in a different way, fudges the question of just whose meaning we
are talking about. When pressed for a description of this fathomer of
meaning, proponents of original meaning suggest something like an
ordinary and reasonable and informed user of the English language at
the time the Constitution was promulgated.6
Once one grapples with any of these formulations, further problems
loom. I will treat only glancingly the difficult, interesting, and important
set of questions about the level of specificity or generality at which
meaning is to be pegged. Nor will I dwell on the historiographical
problems, or whether judges, or law professors for that matter, are
equipped to do, or to evaluate, that kind of work.7 And I will put to the
side what I call the “summing problem,” amalgamating meanings
entertained by multiple people into some coherent whole.8 For each of
the role players, we could shroud the summing problem by use of a
single hypothetical player, and that is what original meaning enthusiasts
basically do. Given the use of such hypothetical constructs, it turns out
that the choice of role players makes very little difference.9 For that
4. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 444–46 (2007).
5. Jack Balkin collapses the two roles by referring to ratifiers as “authorizing
audience.” Balkin, supra note 4, at 445.
6. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 7–11 (1996); Balkin,
supra note 4, at 445; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise,
23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48–49 & nn.10–11 (2006) (where authorities are collected);
Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 554
(2003).
7. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 857,
861 (1989).
8. See Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
445, 456 (1984) (defining the “summing” problem as the “problem of developing a
group intention for the complex activity of promulgating constitutional language that is
carried on by many people in many different legislative bodies”).
9. See Nelson, supra note 6, at 556–58.
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reason, and for ease of discussion, except when I indicate differently, I
will be dealing with a hypothetical original “fathomer of meaning,” a
reasonable user of English living toward the end of the eighteenth
century.
Originalists are sometimes divided into textualists and intentionalists,
with the former insisting that subjective states of mind cannot be
allowed to override the Constitution’s words. But words do not define
themselves, singly, or in phrases, or in documents, so even self-styled
textualists necessarily face an abundance of choices. Is the original
fathomer of meaning understood to be familiar with the whole document
or just the phrase being interpreted? How much does he know of formulations
in the Constitution’s antecedents, the Articles of Confederation, for
instance, or the Magna Carta? Is he versed in the language of the law, or
is his knowledge limited to just colloquial English? Is he used to
meticulous parsing of language, or is he prepared to deal with rhetorical
flourishes, or occasional looseness, or for that matter sloppiness, in the
use of language? Has he thought through the consequences of one
meaning or another that might be attached to his words? And if he is not
allowed to know the motivations of the authors, to what extent is the
fathomer of meaning nonetheless informed about aspects of the
historical setting in which the authors formulated their words?10
The importance of such questions is nicely illustrated by my favorite
constitutional ambiguity, discussion of which was stimulated by what
was billed as a contest announced in a 1995 issue of the journal,
Constitutional Commentary.11 It then became the subject of sometimes
playful discussion among constitutional scholars.12
When Article II says that “[n]o Person except a natural born Citizen,
or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President,”13 does the
phrase the United States refer to an entity that came into existence only
when the Constitution was adopted or to an entity that predated the
Constitution? On the answer to that question, George Washington’s
eligibility to be the nation’s President might seem to have turned, for
Article VII says that “[r]atification of the Conventions of nine States,
10. “Many, if not most, of the provisions of the Constitution do not make sense
except as they are given meaning by the historical background in which they were
adopted.” Antonin Scalia, Is There an Unwritten Constitution?, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 1 (1989).
11. Contest: Was George Washington Constitutional?, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 137–
38 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Jordan Steiker, Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Taking Text and
Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the Crisis of Presidential
Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (emphasis added).
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shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the
States so ratifying.”14 But Washington’s Virginia was not one of the
first nine to ratify the Constitution, so if establishment and adoption are
the same thing, and the Constitution’s “United States” came into existence
at that time, Washington would seem not to have met the citizenship
requirement.15
If one looks solely at the words of the most pertinent constitutional
language—supplemented by some ill-defined appreciation of ordinary
uses of English—one could easily conclude that the United States came
into existence upon ratification by the first nine, so that Washington was
ineligible. But if one looks at other uses of the term the United States in
the Constitution and at the larger historical context, this conclusion
would be called into serious question, for there was something called
“the United States” that preexisted the Constitution.16 Thus, the Articles
of Confederation referred to the entity that it governed as “The United
States of America.”17
But that in turn leads to some awkward possibilities. What if Virginia
had never ratified the Constitution? Would Washington nonetheless
have been a citizen of “the United States” referred to in Article II? Or,
worse yet, what about some previously unknown, but ambitious and
effective political type—say someone like Aaron Burr—from a state
under the Articles that never ratified the Constitution?18 It just could not
be—for a textualist at least—that the seemingly careful stipulation of
qualifications in terms of “citizenship” would allow such a pretender
from what had become a foreign country to become President. But can
14. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
15. See Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, the Founders, and Constitutional Interpretation,
75 TEX. L. REV. 435, 441–42 n.25 (1996) (reviewing JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996)). The
same would be true for a number of other early Presidents. See Steiker et al., supra note
12, at 239–40. Virginia’s ratification came four days after New Hampshire became the
ninth state to sign on. See Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity
from the Articles of Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463, 464
(2004).
16. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; see generally Steiker et al., supra note 12, at
240–42.
17. E.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. I (U.S. 1781).
18. For example, perhaps this person is from Rhode Island, which at the time of
the Constitution had been called such things as the “Quintessence of Villainy” and “a
disgrace to the human race.” Johnson, supra note 15, at 470–71. Rhode Island was the
last of the thirteen to sign on, but did not do so for almost another two years after
Virginia became the tenth state. See Steiker et al., supra note 12, at 238 n.9.
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our reasonable fathomer of meaning be allowed to think about consequences
like that in ascribing meaning to the Constitution’s words?
If the answer to that is in the affirmative, one might then be inclined,
even if uneasily, to conclude that Washington was ineligible. But if one
is allowed to look at the matter from a somewhat different angle, that
judgment could be turned around once more. Washington was one of
the pillars, perhaps the most solid pillar, of the revolutionary generation,
and it was broadly assumed that he would become the first President if
he were willing to serve.19 Can this part of the context in which the
Constitution was scripted be considered to resolve this ambiguity?
When I teach about interpretation of contracts, legislation, and the
United States Constitution respectively, I introduce a superhero for each
context, called in turn Contract Man, Legislation Man, and Constitution
Man. The preoccupations of these super heroes are to swoop down on
the scene as documents within their respective jurisdictions are being
created and pose questions to those involved about the application of
some language they have agreed upon to a problematic situation, usually
one presented by a case we are discussing in class. For example, if
Constitution Man asked those crafting the Constitution whether they
really meant to suggest that, of those alive at the time, only citizens of
the first nine states to ratify would be eligible to be President, I have
little doubt that they would have voiced a consensus that they intended
no such thing, that people from states among the thirteen that eventually
joined would certainly be eligible. For they knew the whole context, and
they would not have wanted to make Washington—or, for that matter,
others from states that eventually signed on—ineligible.
But even for the real authors, if Constitution Man made a pest of
himself and asked about our rogue citizen of a state that never ratified
the Constitution, the authors would almost just as surely have said that
he should not be eligible. Asked if their language made that clear, the
authors would, I imagine, turn sheepish. For the words they used gave
no hint of a distinction between states that eventually signed up and
those that did not. I strongly suspect that they simply never considered
the implications of Article VII for citizens of states other than the first
nine. This is an example, in other words, of language used without great
care.
Because Constitution Man was not actually around to help set things
straight, the present day interpreter must deal with ambiguity and with
sloppiness in the use of language. In the context of statutory interpretation,
19. See Johnson, supra note 15, at 466 & n.10 (citing Letter of Pierce Butler to
Weedon Butler (May 5, 1788), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 302 (Max Farrand ed., 1788)).

650

BENNETT.FINAL.DOC

[VOL. 45: 645, 2008]

10/13/2008 11:22:21 AM

Originalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

doctrines of “absurd results” and of “scrivener’s errors” provide some
leeway to avoid awkward apparent implications of the language used,
but some originalists tend bravely to insist that we are to assume that
constitutional language was used with great care, or at least must be
understood as such.20 Poor George Washington. Sensible interpretation
would make him eligible, but originalist interpretation, if we could only
figure out what that was, might not.
I have Constitution Man interrogating the Constitution’s authors, the
harborers of original intentions. But, as I mentioned earlier, originalists
these days have largely abandoned original intention talk and gravitated
toward the construct of original meaning. So how are we to think about
what our reasonable fathomer of meaning would say? That would
depend on what we allow that hypothetical person to know. And you
will find no ready consensus in originalists’ writing about just what parts
of context can, or should, be taken into account. Thus, one lesson from
this excursion into the George Washington eligibility question is that the
more context we allow our reasonable fathomer of meaning to know, the
harder it is to distinguish him from a hypothetical single author of the
Constitution. In other words, whether there is any distinction between
original intention, on the one hand, and original meaning, on the other,
turns on non-obvious choices that originalists do not always acknowledge
but are nonetheless required.21
I am going to concentrate today on yet another conceptual problem for
originalism: the fact that the world the Constitution must deal with today
is very different from that of 1787. The enormous changes in American
society over the years have encouraged purported alternatives to
originalism, often talked about these days as a “living Constitution.”22
Broadly speaking, living constitutionalists insist that the understanding
20. See, e.g., A KHIL R EED A MAR , T HE B ILL OF R IGHTS : C REATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998); William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern
Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV.
487, 487 (2007) (criticizing Amar’s work); see also Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The
Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 39.
21. For sometimes begrudging acknowledgment of the confluence of the two
notions, see Lawson & Seidman, supra note 6, at 56; see also Nelson, supra note 6, at
555–58. Justice Scalia suggested at his confirmation hearings that there would not be a
big difference between the two. See Balkin, supra note 4, at 448 n.57.
22. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L.
REV. 693, 695 (1976); Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching
Symposium at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTERCENTURY OF DEBATE 55 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007).

651

BENNETT.FINAL.DOC

10/13/2008 11:22:21 AM

of the document must keep up with both changes on the ground and with
different sets of values that may prevail today. Living constitutionalists
have even more conceptual difficulties than do originalists with questions of
just what should guide interpretation, and I have a concluding remark or
two about the notion. But living constitutionalism aside, my focus today
is on whether originalism is up to the task of providing real guidance for
constitutional answers to problems that could not realistically have been
foreseen.
Difficulties of this sort can be real enough for interpreting rather
precise constitutional language, like the twin provisions of Article I that
the Senate is to “be composed of two Senators from each State”23 and of
Article IV that “no new State shall be formed . . . within the Jurisdiction
of any other State . . . without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned . . . .”24 No matter what features of the context at the time we
allow him to appreciate, our fathomer of meaning is not likely to have
pondered the meaning of those provisions for the problem posed, for
example, by a state attempting to secede from the union, with a discrete
portion of the state that wanted none of such secession and then claimed
to form a rival state government that purported to consent on behalf of
that whole state to the creation of a new state out of that discrete portion.
That, of course, is basically what happened when West Virginia broke
away from Virginia and was admitted as a new state in 1863. As a
result, in apparent violation of the constitutional prescription of two
senators per state, there are four senators from what once was the State
of Virginia.25
In the context of statutory interpretation those doctrines of absurd
results and scrivener’s errors can sometimes be helpful. Self-respecting
originalists might, however, stick to their guns should problems like
West Virginia be presented today and insist that clear language meaning
must be heeded.26 No question, they might insist, that two means two,
that consent really means consent, and that means real consent by the
very state, not some portion of the state that simply says it can form a
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
24. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
25. See generally Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia
Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291, 297 (2002).
26. But in an otherwise wonderful article on the West Virginia problem, two selfstyled originalists do not stick to their guns. Relying on a “legal fiction”—indeed, in
their words, “one of the great constitutional legal fictions of all time”—that the part was
the lawful government of the whole, Vasan Kesavan and Michael Paulsen rather find that
the admission of West Virginia was—originalistically speaking—constitutional.
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 25, at 294, passim. Dare I point out that if “legal
fictions” can be allowed to do originalist work, the approach patently contains no
constraints whatsoever?
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new government for the whole.27 To be sure, it is presumably too late to
kick West Virginia out of the Senate and the Union, and even the most
fearless originalist would be well advised not to try while Robert Byrd is
around to object. But errors may be made with any approach to
interpretation, and the heroic originalist might insist that past errors are
no excuse for countenancing new ones.
Much more nettlesome for the originalist—because they are at the
heart of the most visible contemporary constitutional controversies—are
the unforeseen problems that must be addressed with imprecise constitutional
language. We have already glimpsed the problem of ambiguity, but
ambiguous language at least might seem to present a constrained set of
possibilities. Vague language poses the problem of lack of foresight
much more insistently. There are many examples of vague—but frequently
invoked—constitutional phraseology: due process of law, equal protection
of the laws, unreasonable searches and seizures, cruel and unusual
punishment, and rights retained by the people.28
Vague constitutional language might seem to provide an opening for
living constitutionalists,29 but the typical originalist move instead is a
measure of intentionalism. Robert Bork, for instance, a hero among
originalists,30 depicts the task of the modern day interpreter as finding a
“principle” that “the Framers put into” the document, by examining its
“text, structure, and history.” Once found, the “principle” can then be
applied to solve some modern problem, even if that particular problem
had not been foreseen. Bork stated in a speech delivered on these very
premises, that it is in this way that:
We are able to apply the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause to the electronic
media and to the changing impact of libel litigation upon all the media; we are
able to apply the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches
and seizures to electronic surveillance; we apply the Commerce Clause to state
regulations of interstate trucking.31

27. Id. at 301–02.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend IX.
29. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 291–92 (2007). Cf. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 121–
25 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 6–7 (1999).
30. See Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, in
ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE, supra note 22, at 1, 14.
31. Judge Robert H. Bork, Speech at the University of San Diego School of Law
(Nov. 18, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE, supra note 22, at
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Today I want to concentrate not on the hushed tones of vague
constitutional language, but on a dimension of constitutional interpretation
that is seldom discussed, indeed not even much appreciated as presenting
some difficulty. These are problems posed by constitutional silence,
things left unsaid. For even more than vague language, constitutional
silence can be easily ignored as time goes by. The result is that the
treatment of constitutional silence can be powerfully instructive about
the application of the Constitution to problems that were not foreseen
when the document was promulgated.
The Constitution leaves most things unsaid, of course. It has nary a
word about ancient Chinese art. But that, of course, is not its subject.
Freedom of speech is one of its subjects, but it says nothing about
communication over the internet. Who knows if the Constitution might
have said something about the internet had it been around at the time,
but at least one reason the Constitution is silent about the internet is that
nobody at the time foresaw that modern phenomenon. But there is
another big reason that the Constitution may be silent about some things.
They were not said because they did not need saying. They were things,
as we say, that go without saying. They were simply assumed, and
conceivably with even greater clarity than some things that were said.
Constitutional silence comes in many shapes and forms. Bork
mentioned the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press,
and, of course, there is a Free Speech Clause in the First Amendment as
well.32 But neither Clause says anything about non-speech communication,
like handwritten letters. If the generation here today does not know
what those are, they were a precursor to email, and the constitutional
generation produced a large quantity of them.33
In a widely noted essay, Justice Scalia tells us that letters “cannot be
censored” by the government on account of the Speech and Press
Clauses, which he says, by a “reasonable construction,” “stand as a sort
of synecdoche for the whole.”34 But if the point is that the people
83, 87. Bork tended to talk of “original intention” and, as mentioned, “original meaning”
seems to be ascendant these days. But, as we have seen, the approach might be adapted
to original meaning simply by allowing our fathomer of meaning to understand enough
of what animated the authors so that he could appreciate the constitutional “principle” to
be applied.
32. Bork, supra note 31, at 87.
33. A book has recently been published of the very extensive handwritten
correspondence between Abigail and John Adams. MY DEAREST FRIEND: LETTERS OF
ABIGAIL AND JOHN ADAMS (Margaret A. Hogan & C. James Taylor eds., Belknap Press
2007).
34. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (1997). Justice Scalia has
apparently taken a similar stance with things left unsaid in the Eleventh Amendment.
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responsible for the phraseology of the First Amendment—or the
“reasonable” person fathoming the meaning at the time—would have
understood the protection as extending generally to communication of
all sorts, why was that not said? There may well be an explanation, like
fixation on specific problems in the recent past, rhetorical flourish, or
comfortable, but loose, use of language. Bork’s discussion of electronic
media shows that he would have little problem fitting Scalia’s move into
his methodology.35 Bork would say that one can “discover” a general
“principle” of free and open communication, or some such thing.36 But I
think the example begins to show a certain slipperiness on the slope of
silence.
Sometimes it is hard to discern any principles that might help fill
silent spaces, let alone principles that were “put into” the document,
though not in so many words. One of my favorite examples is the
Constitution’s failure to say anything about how the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is to be chosen, or indeed how long his tenure of service
in that office is to be. The only mention of a Chief Justice in the
Constitution is in Article I where we are told that if the Senate is called
upon to try an impeachment of the President, “the Chief Justice shall
preside.”37 Article III, where a provision for selecting the person to fill
that office might be expected to have been placed, only comes close to
the subject when it tells us that there is to be a Supreme Court and that it
will have “Judges” on it who will serve “during Good Behaviour.”38
Now it appears that Washington, once the qualification hurdle had
been ignored and he had become President, assumed that he could

See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Interpretive Issues in Seminole and Alden, 55 SMU L. REV.
377, 380 (2002).
35. See Bork, supra note 31, at 83–87.
36. But perhaps that move is too fast. Originalists are merciless in criticism of
Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, which found that several
provisions of the Bill of Rights that protect aspects of personal privacy “have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Building from there, Justice Douglas found a general
protection for privacy that justified a conclusion that state restrictions on access of
married couples to birth control devices was unconstitutional. Id. at 495–97. Bork
criticizes Griswold as choosing a “level of abstraction” of the principle that “expanded
[the Bill of Rights] beyond the known intentions of the Framers.” Bork, supra note 31,
at 90.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
38. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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nominate a Judge to be Chief Justice.39 The extended drama of the first
Chief’s replacement then eventuated in presidential nomination and
Senate confirmation of a new Chief from among the sitting Justices.40
Nobody has seriously questioned presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation since then, and a large number of duties—some quite
sensitive—have been attached by legislation over the years to the office
of Chief Justice.41
But there are other ways to choose a Chief Justice, some of which
some state supreme courts used at the time. The judges themselves
might choose a chief, or seniority might be used, or the post could rotate.
Or the matter could be decided by statute.42 As far as principles go, I
know of no discovery of one that would lead to the present system, and I
can think of some candidates—like separation of powers—that would
call presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation into serious
question.43 Just to provide an inkling of the problems that silence might
invite, would it be open to a contemporary litigant—–should he be able
to surmount standing problems—to challenge one of the statutes giving
the Chief Justice extensive powers beyond that of presiding over the
Court’s sessions and deliberations because his appointment was in violation
of a separation of powers principle put into the Constitution?
Some contemporary originalist commentators might argue that the
silence on choice of the Chief Justice is an appropriate occasion for
judicial “construction,” answers to questions where no “principle” is
“fairly discoverable” in the document, here perhaps informed by practice
over the years, where, of course, there has been a consistent approach to
the manner of choosing the Chief Justice.44 Putting aside whether that is
just a copout for a very important question about how that very powerful
post is to be filled, some constitutional silences are more pregnant than
this one.
I have three examples of pregnant silences that I want to use to
illustrate how ill-equipped originalism is for coming to grips with
unforeseen problems. They involve different types and shades of
silence, and their substantive implications intersect in interesting ways.
First, there is silence, not entirely of the Constitution itself, but even
more of the federal courts, about the Guarantee Clause. Second, the
39. See Edward T. Swaine, Hail, No: Changing the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L.
REV. 1709, 1716 (2006).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1711–13.
42. See id. at 1715 n.30. Or the choice might be made by lot. Id. at 1716 n.33.
43. See id. at 1724.
44. See generally BARNETT, supra note 29, at 118–30; WHITTINGTON, supra note
29, at 7–13.
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Constitution itself is stunningly silent about any role for political parties
in American public life. Finally, the Constitution’s provisions for an
electoral college to choose our President say nothing explicit about
whether electors can be bound to the choice they signaled beforehand to
the voters who put them in office.
The Constitution’s Article IV says that “[t]he United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”45 This
is variously known as the “Guarantee Clause” and the “Republican Form
of Government Clause.” There are lots of questions that the phraseology
might raise, but one might have thought that originalists would dwell on
the central concern about just what makes a form of government
“republican.” I have by no means mined the historical materials for all
they are worth, but I think it fair to say that there are two major candidates:
first, a government answerable ultimately to the people, rather than a
monarchy or an aristocracy, and second—a more constrained version of
the first and the more likely “principle” to be found if there is one that
was somehow “put into” the Constitution—popular government in which
policy choices are made by a representative assembly.
The question is particularly interesting because this second answer
would raise the most serious doubts about the republican bona fides of a
great deal of what is called “direct democracy” in modern American
state governance.46 Basically these are the processes of initiative, referendum,
and recall, and there is no reason to think they were foreseen by authors,
audience, or reasonable fathomers of meaning at the time the Guarantee
Clause was made law.47
Direct democracy along these lines is quite familiar to you Californians,
and to citizens of a number of other states as well, and its processes are
controversial. There are certainly plausible arguments on both sides of
the question of whether they are healthy parts of the mix of decisionmaking in
the states, but the policy arguments against direct democracy are very
weighty. It is not conducive to detailed debate and deliberation among
the ultimate decisionmakers, nor to a process of compromise characteristic of

45. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative
Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign Against Homosexuality,
72 OR. L. REV. 19, 29 (1993).
47. See Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” May Mean More Than “Legislature”:
Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 599 (2008).
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legislative assemblies. These are just the kinds of objections that would
be marshaled against direct democracy if judicial review of its
constitutionality were possible under the Guarantee Clause. Challengers
would urge, as a leading historian of the times of the Constitution’s
promulgation—and a former Nathanson lecturer—put it: “Republicanism . . .
logically presumed a legislature in which the various groups in the
society would realize ‘the necessary dependence and connection’ each
had upon the others.”48
But the federal judiciary will entertain no such test. Direct democracy
came into fashion in the progressive era around the turn of the last
century.49 Oregon was a leader, and a 1902 amendment to the Oregon
Constitution provided that “the people reserve to themselves . . . power . . .
to propose laws and amendments to the [state] Constitution and [to]
enact or reject them at an election independently of the Legislative
Assembly.”50 A 1906 tax law passed under this initiative procedure, and
a refusal to pay the tax by Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph
Company led to a 1912 decision by the United States Supreme Court.51
Relying on the 1849 decision in Luther v. Borden, the Court held that
Guarantee Clause questions, including that pressed by the telephone
company, were nonjusticiable political questions.52 They were for the
Congress, the “political department.”53
There has been no serious move by the federal courts to revisit this
holding, and Congress has shown little interest in judging the validity of
direct democracy. Nor have state courts taken seriously the large
question of the republican bona fides of direct democracy. At the same
time, however, many challenges to specific pieces of legislation or to
state constitutional provisions enacted by direct democratic processes are
entertained by state courts54 and also by federal courts.55
In holding republican form of government questions nonjusticiable,
the Supreme Court did not deny that there are answers to the constitutional
questions, only that the judiciary is the place for those answers to be
given. If the answer to the Guarantee Clause question could be illegitimacy,
however, how is a self-respecting originalist to think about the legitimacy of

48. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–
1787, at 179 (1969).
49. Linde, supra note 46, at 24 n.19.
50. OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2(a).
51. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
52. Id. at 149.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., VanSickle v. Shanahan, 511 P.2d 223, 227, 232 (Kan. 1973).
55. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
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some measure passed by a process that is constitutionally rotten from the
outset? There is, I think, no good answer to that question.
There are both smaller and larger versions of the dilemma. Many
constitutional tests turn on the motivation with which legislation—or
some regulation—was passed.56 The summing problem that I mentioned
earlier haunts the ascription of motivation to legislation as well as to
constitutional provisions, but the problems are multiplied many times for
direct democratic measures where hundreds of thousands of individual
decisionmakers are involved. In addition, their real motivations are
especially unfathomable because of the secrecy of the ballot. A common
technique in the law to deal with difficulties of proof is a presumption.
But if that approach were used here, should there be a presumption of
benign motivation, or malign? Can a satisfactory originalist answer
really be given to that question oblivious to the unaddressed matter of
republican bona fides?
Another small scale problem is a hot button issue right now here in
California. The Constitution assigns various functions to state legislatures.
They originally chose United States Senators.57 They are to play a role
in constitutional amendment.58 They can regulate the time, place, and
manner of elections for Senators and Representatives.59 They are the
bodies the consent of which is necessary for the formation of new states
out of their territories.60 And they are given the authority to determine
the “manner” of choosing presidential electors.61 The November ballot
in California may well present an initiative which would purport to
exercise this last power by changing California from a winner-take-all
system of choosing electors to one where each congressional district has
a separate election for an elector.62 Can there be an originalist answer to
the constitutionality of this way of proceeding that blinds its eye to the
Guarantee Clause question?
And then there is an even more momentous and large-scale issue of
how we are to approach problems of federalism—state prerogatives—

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
Electoral Revision Misses June Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2007, at A26.
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that vex much of contemporary constitutional law.63 That is another
important matter on which there is more constitutional muffle than
sound. But that has not stopped strong feelings about federalism from
surfacing on the Supreme Court, in the opinions of both self-described
originalists and others.64 Is it even meaningful, however, to puzzle about
an originalist answer to those questions that ignores the republican bona
fides of so much state decisionmaking?
There is, I fear, no originalist trail for those questions either. This
seems rather obvious for states where robust direct democratic procedures
are found. But then, could it really not also be so for old-fashioned
states like mine—Illinois—where direct democracy has not much been
embraced? For, could an originalist in the name of federalism countenance
different sets of state prerogatives depending upon variable decisionmaking
structures in the states?
None of these problems has been addressed explicitly in Supreme
Court opinions, either by asking the republican form of government
question, or by asking how one should factor in the self-imposed silence
on that question. But what is perhaps most interesting is that the Court
often seems to embrace direct democracy with enthusiasm, singing its
praises as “devotion to democracy.”65 And that seems to be the stance
adopted by the two self-described originalists on today’s Supreme Court,
Justices Scalia and Thomas.66 In opinions testing specific direct democratic
measures, they have intimated that direct democracy is especially
virtuous, providing more reason to uphold such measures than if they
had been adopted by legislatures. In one decision, for instance, Justice
Scalia referred to the initiative process as “this most democratic of
procedures.”67 And in a different case, Justice Thomas criticized the majority
opinion from which he was dissenting for failing to explain “why giving
effect to the people’s [direct democratic] decision would violate
‘democratic principles’ that undergird the Constitution.”68
My point is not that there are better originalist answers to the
questions posed in those cases than the answers provided by our two
63. Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–18 (2000) with
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005). On the possibility of contemporary confusion,
see Johnson, supra note 15, at 492–93.
64. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (writing for himself and Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and
Scalia).
65. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976)
(citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
66. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); U.S.
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
67. Romer, 517 U.S. at 647.
68. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 883.

660

BENNETT.FINAL.DOC

[VOL. 45: 645, 2008]

10/13/2008 11:22:21 AM

Originalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

originalist Supreme Court Justices. Nor am I proposing better answers
of any sort. The first lesson I draw rather is that there are no originalist
answers, because the trail has been lost. The Constitution’s and the
Court’s silences on the republican form of government clause has left a
gaping hole in addressing questions raised by specific direct democratic
measures. A second lesson is in many ways more important. Other—
very important—constitutional matters are closely touched by republican
form of government concerns. Silence on the one confounds analysis of
the others in originalist terms. More lost trails.
And a third lesson is taught by our self-described originalists who sing
the praises of “democratic principles.” Where do they get those
principles? Not from originalist inquiries, at least as of 1787, that is for
sure. For whatever one thinks the Guarantee Clause means, the meaning
fathomer at the time would not have thought that today’s embrace of
popular rule was implied by anything in the Constitution. In fact, the
franchise was restricted at the time. Slaves, of course, could not vote,
nor could women, nor many adult men. Furthermore, Senators were not
elected. Now, to be sure there have been many amendments to the
Constitution since that time, and they do reflect an increasing devotion to
popular election and adult suffrage.69 Whether original meaning is to be
pegged at the time—or should I say times—of amendments or of the
original Constitution, or somehow at some amalgam of those times, is
yet another puzzle of originalism that I will have to leave unattended
today.70
But even if we could wrestle down that question on a theoretical level,
there is not much of a puzzle about where our originalist judges get their
enthusiasm for “democracy.” They get it not by puzzling about the
relevance of this amendment or that, but from contemporary American
values that they have absorbed. This example is one where the
gravitation to those contemporary values is, I think, right out in the open
for all to see.
My next example is one where the constitutional silence is deafening.
Political parties are central players in American political life, but they
are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution. It does not take much
knowledge of constitutional history to appreciate why. Parties were
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
70. But see infra note 78.
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viewed at the time as forces to be marginalized and controlled as best as
possible. In Federalist No. 10, Madison surely had political parties in
mind as examples of “factions” when he wrote:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.71

For Madison, factions, including parties, were mischievous because of
their inclination and capacity to interfere with wholesome governance in
which a “small number of citizens elected by the rest” would have the
“wisdom” to “best discern the true interest of their country.”72 That, of
course, harks back to our republican form of government question. But
more to the present point, in Madison’s mind the large republic that the
Constitution fashioned would multiply the factions seeking a piece of the
action, with the result that they would stymie one another and make all
less capable of mischievous interference with wholesome decisionmaking.
To be sure, parties did emerge not long thereafter, and Madison was a
central player in one of the major ones.73 Those first incarnations of
political parties in American politics did not view themselves as
mischievous factions but rather as collaborative enterprises by genuine
seekers of the public good. That probably allowed Madison and others
to reconcile their disdain for factions with their party activity. But it was
only a few decades later that parties had unabashedly assumed their
modern factional faces. Now political parties may well be necessary to
coordinate mass sentiment in a functioning democracy. Some version of
that rationale is the usual justification for political parties offered by
students of democratic governance.74 But there was barely a hint of such
a rationale as the Constitution was being crafted.
Fast forward to the modern day. For many reasons, there is a great
deal of tension in the way constitutional law treats parties, but it is not
recognizably tension born of power asserted in fact in the face of
constitutional disfavor. Much of the modern tension focuses on whether
71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
As one commentator puts it more generally in a classic study of political parties in the
United States, “the Founding Fathers . . . did not believe in political parties as such,
scorned those that they were conscious of as historical models, [and] had a keen terror of
party spirit and its evil consequences . . . .” RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A
PARTY SYSTEM viii (1969). Two more recent commentators describe the Constitution’s
Framers as “despis[ing] . . . political parties.” Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2312 (2006).
72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 71, at 62.
73. HOFSTADTER, supra note 71, at 54–55.
74. See generally HOFSTADTER, supra note 71, at 212–71; Levinson & Pildes,
supra note 71, at 2379–80.
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parties are state actors subject to constitutional restrictions as such, or
private actors entitled to constitutional protections.75 I think it fair to say
that this modern tension would be unrecognizable, even bewildering, to
the constitutional generation, at least unless we could somehow educate
its members about—and thereby reconcile them to—what had happened
with parties and politics in the United States in the intervening 220
years.
So how is a self-respecting originalist to think about the constitutional
status of political parties? The problem here is as much new worlds as
lost trails. And unlike popular decisionmaking, there is not much in the
way of later constitutional amendment—words instead of silence—to
help out.76 So will it do to note the silence, and thus conclude that the
Constitution has no relevance for the status of political parties? Original
meaning enthusiasts of a textualist bent might take that position, though
the call of context can be pretty compelling and inferences about things
left unsaid are often drawn from things said. Is it so clear that the
sounds of the silence about political parties fail to convey a pretty clear
original message of their disfavor if one is allowed to delve into the
pertinent history?
Luckily—or perhaps unluckily—there really is no such choice. For
the fact of political parties inescapably bears on all sorts of things that
the Constitution does say, or pretty clearly implies. This is like the
federalism problem in light of republican form of government concerns,
only in a form not even an insistent textualist could evade.
Consider, for instance, a recent Supreme Court decision concluding,
inter alia, that severe restrictions placed by Vermont on campaign
contributions by political parties violated the First Amendment’s free

75. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992). For an instructive
rendition of the history of this tension, see LEON D. EPSTEIN, POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE
AMERICAN MOLD 155–99 (1986).
76. The most promising possibility is probably the Twelfth Amendment.
Originally, presidential electors cast two votes undifferentiated between President and
Vice-President. If a single person received a majority of the appointed electors, he
became President, and the runner-up became Vice-President. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §
1, cl. 3. But after political parties came on the scene, they slated candidates for the two
offices, and electors generally followed the lead of the parties. That led to a tie in the
1800 election and one big mess. That in turn resulted in passage of the Twelfth
Amendment, separating the votes for President and Vice-President. The Amendment
does not explicitly mention political parties, but awareness of what led to its adoption
shows that they were just offstage, influencing what the Amendment did say. See
ROBERT W. BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 20–24 (2006).

663

BENNETT.FINAL.DOC

10/13/2008 11:22:21 AM

speech guarantee, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.77 There is a large set of interpretational
questions raised by the Vermont scheme,78 but I want to concentrate on a
relatively simple one that is almost never noticed or discussed. Are
political parties protected by the Constitution’s rather explicit solicitude
for freedom of speech?
The First Amendment’s protection of “freedom of speech” sounds
sweeping: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging” that freedom.79
But we have already seen that Justice Scalia is willing to take some
liberties with its apparent literal reach. And indeed I know of no
constitutional theorist who does not acknowledge that some restrictions
on speech are permissible and that some communicative non-speech is
protected. In any event, the Clause tells us precious little about just who
enjoys that “freedom” or indeed just what is meant by freedom. So are
political parties entitled to this freedom?
We could well imagine that Madison and his compatriots would, at
least initially, be disdainful of any suggestion that political parties could
seek shelter under that capacious umbrella. When they fashioned the
Constitution, they might well have assumed that freedom of speech
belonged only to individuals. It could be argued that that is one reason
that the institution of “the press” is mentioned separately. But if we
situated the question in today’s context, I have no idea how Madison and
his coconspirators would resolve questions about the legal status of
political parties and their attempts to get the word out. And that is just
the point. History has left behind the vision that actors contemporaneous
77. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
78. For instance, is the Bill of Rights—including the First Amendment—
applicable to the states through incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment? If so,
through which clause: the Privileges and Immunities Clause or the Due Process Clause?
If we settle those questions in favor of incorporation, is the content of the First
Amendment, passed at one time in our nation’s history, the same as its Fourteenth
Amendment version, incorporated some seventy years later? And if they are the same, is
the “meaning” we are to fathom an eighteenth or a nineteenth century one? Originalists
disagree on these questions as well. Compare BARNETT, supra note 29, at 108, with
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 6, at 47–49. The answers to these questions would no
doubt require grappling with the tensions of federalism, but are today’s versions of those
tensions normatively congruent with those of the eighteenth century or of the nineteenth?
See Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1042
(1981). Query whether there are answers to these questions that could plausibly be
ascribed to our hypothetical individual—wherever we situate him in the time
dimension—but if we did settle them we would still have additional ones about the
content of the guarantee of free speech. Even apart from political parties, is it available
to corporate bodies? Does it forbid just prior restraints, or does it reach as well postspeech penalties? Is the contribution of money to another who will do the speaking
protected? And then what are we to do with the problem of precedent—intermediate
judicial decisions on any of these questions?
79. U.S. CONST. amend I.
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with the Constitution’s formation held of political parties, and there is no
way to recapture their world and refashion ours in its image.
A second instructive case, again from California, compounds the
complications of the status of political parties with that of direct
democracy. This is the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in California
Democratic Party v. Jones, written for the Court by Justice Scalia.80 By
initiative, California had attempted to change its system for party
nominations from a closed primary to a blanket primary.81 Under the old
system, a California primary voter received a ballot of his declared party
alone, and he chose as he wished among those seeking that party’s
nomination for the various offices to be filled at the general election. In
the new, initiated, system, in contrast, a primary voter received a ballot
with all candidates of all parties listed, and he could cross party lines as
often as he wanted in voting for party nominees for the various offices.
Supporters of the blanket primary had touted it as encouraging more
politically moderate nominees. In one formulation that the Court discussed,
the blanket primary was defended as “expanding candidate debate beyond
the scope of partisan concerns.”82
In response to a challenge by the California Democratic Party, the
Court held that the blanket primary interfered with the First Amendment
rights of individuals to associate in political parties, though it also spoke
of “the political association’s [that is, the party’s] right to exclude.”83
The opinion is suffused with concern for preserving the central political
role played by political parties. Along the way Justice Scalia noted that
“[t]he formation of national political parties was almost concurrent with
the formation of the Republic itself.”84
This last comment is a bit ironic for an originalist, because, as
mentioned earlier, that “almost concurrence” made a large difference.
The Jones opinion makes no attempt to fathom original intention,
understanding, or meaning with regard to political parties—or with
regard to direct democracy. Nor is that surprising, since political parties
are right in the middle of contemporary American politics, and there is
no way in our world to return us to some vision of their role held or
understood at the time of the Constitution. Originalism would be
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
Id. at 569.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
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hopelessly at sea if we turned to it—in any of its forms—to guide us to
some secure harbor where we could come up with an answer to the
blanket primary by initiative question.
Political parties also bedevil a problem posed by my final example of
constitutional silence. This is one I have written about before.85 Much
discussed in the literature on the electoral college is the problem of
faithless electors, electors who cast their presidential or vice-presidential
votes differently from what the voters who voted them into office were
led to believe.86 The constitutional question I have in mind is whether
such faithlessness can be forbidden by state law.
While faithless votes have never changed the outcome of a presidential
election, there have been a number of such votes over the years, about a
dozen by most counts. There was, for instance, a faithless abstention of
a District of Columbia elector in the 2000 election, and a Minnesota
elector in 2004 voted faithlessly for John Edwards for President, rather
than for John Kerry.87 Even more suggestive is the case of Richie Robb,
a prominent Republican in West Virginia who was slated by his party for
the post of presidential elector in the 2004 election, and then announced
before the election that he did not think that he could vote for George
Bush in the electoral college balloting.88 The Republicans carried West
Virginia, and Robb must have voted for Bush in the state’s secret
electoral college balloting, because all the West Virginia electors did.89
Robb thus does not count in the dozen or so faithless votes over the
years. But you can be sure that he would have been vigorously courted
by the Democrats if there had been a close electoral college outcome,
say an apparent tie or an apparent victory for Bush by two votes.
Some commentators, no doubt inspired by originalist themes, find it
obvious that faithlessness cannot be forbidden, because the original idea
of the electoral college was of a discretion-laden set of decisionmakers who
would meet in their various states to debate and decide how they would
vote. This is a “principle” that they presumably find the Framers “put into”
the electoral college provisions. A state law that forbade faithlessness, it
is argued, would violate that principle.90
The provision of Article II that entered into our discussion of the
meaning of “legislature” says that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a [defined] Number of
85. See BENNETT, supra note 76, at 95–121.
86. LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER
110–13 (1996).
87. BENNETT, supra note 76, at 96.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 15–17 and accompanying notes.
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Electors . . . but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office
of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”91
The casting and counting of electoral votes is then dealt with, as follows,
in the Twelfth Amendment:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant
of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person
voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as VicePresident, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for . . . which
lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the
government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted.92

While this says nothing explicit about elector discretion, even an
interpreter cast in the role of the fathomer of original meaning might
readily infer that electors were to have discretion. Many “principles”
that originalists, like Bork, Scalia, and lots of academics, find were put
into the Constitution—like the devotion to democracy that we
discussed—are the result of interpreter choice rather than of anything
more genuinely thought of as original intention or original meaning. But
I would not make that claim for a conclusion about elector discretion.
The language is itself suggestive. Some have found the mention of a
“ballot” to imply choice.93 And why be concerned that an elector not be
a Senator or Representative and not hold an office of “Trust or Profit
under the United States,” unless one was worried about poisoning the
exercise of discretion.94 But even more fundamentally, the office of
elector has no apparent purpose if electors were simply to cast votes that
had already been determined for them. Not to put too fine a point on it,
elector discretion is not explicitly mentioned, probably because it was
thought to be obvious.
To be sure, in the first two elections, Washington received a
presidential vote from each and every elector who cast a vote.95 That,
91.
92.
93.

U.S CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
NEAL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 128–
29 (rev. ed. 1981).
94. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
95. As mentioned earlier, at the time, electors cast two votes for President, for two
different persons. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3. Not all the states had ratified the
Constitution in time for the first election, however, and in addition, New York, which
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however, was not on account of any formal pre-commitment, but rather
because Washington seemed the natural choice. As suggested earlier,
the Framers would likely have told Constitution Man that Washington
would be the first President if he made himself available. But, if Constitution
Man pressed them—or for that matter a fathomer of meaning at the
time—on what would happen in the selection process once Washington
was no longer available for the office, they would even more surely have
responded with a picture of discretion-laden discussion, debate, and then
voting at those meetings of electors. If the Constitution implies with
reasonable clarity that Constitution Man would elicit an affirmative
response to the question of elector discretion back then, however, does
it also answer the question of the faithless elector in today’s world?
We are perhaps given a hint of an answer by the changed terminology.
Just how did a wholesome thing like discretion come to be talked about
as a breach of faith? And the answer starts with our old friend: political
parties. As Justice Scalia’s remark suggested, change in that aspect
of our public life came very rapidly in the early years under the
Constitution.96 By the time Washington was nearing the end of his
second four-year term and had made clear his intention not to seek a
third, the beginnings of what we might now recognize as two major
national parties were in plain sight.97 Many candidates for legislative
office identified with one or the other of those parties. Congressional
caucuses of the two parties then designated candidates for President and
Vice-President for the election of 1796, and many of those chosen as
electors at the state level signaled a party affiliation as well.98 Parties
then tried to orchestrate what would take place at the elector meetings,
by insinuating party fidelity as a major consideration for selection as an
elector.99 The possibility of faithlessness was born, and really quite
early in the history of the Republic.100
The reality of faithlessness, however, took a while to sink in, as
American politics underwent large scale change with those political
parties smack dab in the middle. I am concentrating on how we choose
a President, for it should suffice to draw the stark contrast between the
world the Constitution envisaged and our own. But make no mistake,
today’s broader world of politics would be unrecognizable to those who
was on board, failed to designate electors. See JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE
EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR
VOTE 40–42 (2006).
96. See supra text accompanying note 84.
97. HOFSTADTER, supra note 71, at 91–102.
98. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 93, at 61–65.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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were drafting, understanding, and attempting to fathom the meaning of
the Constitution at our constitutional beginnings.
On what is universally called “election day” in early November every
four years, in addition to whatever state and local offices are in play, we
are, under an originalist way of thinking, supposed to be voting not for
presidential and vice-presidential candidates—but for those electors. It
is they who are then supposed to elect the nation’s executive officers
when they meet in their respective states some forty days later. Now
how many of you knew that?
This is a pretty sophisticated audience, so there may be a few of you
who could honestly answer “yes.” But I am pretty sure that even those
did not learn it from experience as a voter. In most states, the names of
electors do not even appear on the ballot. In Illinois, there is no hint on
the ballot of a role for them, and states that do provide a hint typically do
so in fine print. The large print is reserved for the name—and political
party designation—of party candidates. The result is that voters think
they are voting directly for presidential and vice-presidential candidates
nominated by political parties—as a tied pair, moreover—not for
electors who will themselves choose the executive officers—in separate
exercises of choice—weeks later.
So how might we recapture some original meaning about elector
discretion? Discretion might, I suppose, be permissible even if we
called it faithlessness, but if so, we would also have to do something
about the situation that has even allowed that inappropriate terminology
to creep into our political discourse. Presidential candidates’ names surely
could not appear on the ballot, for that is effectively an assertion of precommitment. It fools the voter, and is inconsistent with that vaunted
discretion. Nor could political party designations appear, for the dual reasons
that they too suggest pre-commitment, and because it puts political
parties in the middle rather than at the margins of the political process.
But you get the point. We cannot realistically hope to recapture some
original vision of presidential elections, because we have traveled so far
from that vision that it would tear the fabric of presidential selection
apart if we tried—and quite possibly American democracy with it.
There is a lesson here about the ways language can be deceptive. The
contemporary issue of elector faithlessness can be cast as one of
“discretion.” And put simply in terms of discretion, original intention,
or original meaning is seemingly discernible. But the issue back then was
imbedded in a large and complex context that bears scant resemblance to
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that of the issue today. That is why we speak of faithlessness today
rather than discretion. If the issue back then and the issue today are
understood in their respective settings, they are not the same issue at all.
Talk of discretion can appear to make them the same, but that is only
because language necessarily oversimplifies a complex reality.
I chose these examples of things not explicitly addressed by the
Constitution because I think they help us see how the march of history
can obscure constitutional issues that may once have seemed relatively
straightforward. But that phenomenon does not depend on silences.
Constitutional silence can cloud over an issue, so that its pertinence at
any given point in time is made more difficult to see. But even for
reasonably precise constitutional language, today’s issue can be worlds
removed from what the draftsmen—or some original fathomer of
meaning—would have said came to mind. That was the lesson that I
meant to convey in the discussion of West Virginia. Vague constitutional
language in many ways is closer to silence in allowing the constitutional
significance of change to go unnoticed. Indeed, the line between what is
said and unsaid is far from a bright one. It might well seem, for instance,
that the Constitution addresses more explicitly the question of elector
discretion than it does just what is protected by the Ninth Amendment’s
unadorned mention of “rights.”101
So what are we to do? There is an arena for constitutional questions
where the constitutional language seems to provide an answer in a
relatively straightforward way. To be President, for instance, an individual
must have “attained to the age of thirty five years.”102 And the virtue of
a nice clear answer to what age is necessary would probably overwhelm
any argument that the purpose behind the requirement is a certain
maturity and that these days that can be attained earlier—or later—than
thirty-five.103 But this problem has another feature that is seldom noted.
Any age qualification is going to be arbitrary, and no underlying
principle is likely to be discernible that might provide serious guidance
for deviations from the seemingly clear language.
Where principles are more obviously at work, however, even precise
language might be approached with more abandon, especially when
events put on pressure, as in the West Virginia example. Be that as it
101. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
102. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
103. In a much-noted lecture, Justice Scalia invokes a subtle and interesting
example where rather specific language is taken to overwhelm arguable changes in the
normative dimension of confrontation clause problems. See Scalia, supra note 7, at 855–
56 (discussing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)). But cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is
Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for President Strom Thurmond, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 217 (1996).
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may, however, the real problems arise when, for one reason or another,
the language just does not do the trick. This is vague language, or in the
examples we have traversed today, little or no language at all. If a
contemporary problem arises under such language that differs in no
discernible normative dimension from a problem that was a matter of
focused concern at the time the Constitution was crafted, then an
originalist answer—whether styled a matter of intention, understanding,
or meaning—is available, and would probably be readily embraced. I
say “probably” because we really have very little to go on to test the
proposition. Whether a contemporary problem differs from a problem of
original concern in a discernible normative dimension will typically be
contestable. And not surprisingly, after 220 years, arguments that the
issues are not the same will quite often be more than plausible. If
nothing else, I hope my excursions today into the meaning of constitutional
silences will have made that clear.
If originalism fails to provide answers to so many contemporary
questions, where are we to turn for those answers? This is not the occasion
for me to provide any full discussion of alternatives, which is not to
suggest that I have a nicely packaged set of them to be delivered at my
next lecture. But part of the answer is simple judicial choice. It could be
called a “living Constitution,” but Justice Scalia would say that it is the
displacing of democratic decisionmaking with the whims of “nine lawyers.”104
Now I am far from a full-throated defender of the present reach of
judicial review. But for several reasons, I also think that the “whim”
point is overstated. There is no canonical definition of democracy that
allows the stark contrast between decisions of appointed judges and
those of elected officials. As mentioned, the original constitutional scheme
had United States Senators appointed by state legislatures.105 But even
now, by some plausible ways of parsing the notion of democracy, the
Senate—even without the institution of the filibuster—is quite
undemocratic.106 And those appointed judges get appointed through a
process that requires the assent of two different kinds of elected officials.

104. Scalia Slams ‘Living Constitution’ Theory, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 14, 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,150428,00.html; see Rehnquist, supra note 22, at
695 (“[N]onelected members of the federal judiciary . . . responsible to no constituency
whatever . . . .”).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
106. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537–39 (1964).
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The decisions of those judges, moreover, are not unconstrained and
unchecked. The Supreme Court has a degree of control over its agenda,
but a good deal less than legislatures, or even the executive. In addition,
a good part of the Court’s agenda control is legislatively sanctioned.
There is, moreover, a variety of other legislative checks on the Court’s
freedom to maneuver, from control over budgets and jurisdiction, all
the way up to the impeachment possibility. And there are norms of
decisionmaking—precedent, political question doctrine, deference to
other decisionmakers—that judges internalize.
I am no romantic about these things. I will listen carefully to suggestions
about how one might rein in judicial discretion. But I fervently believe
that those possibilities lie more in the realm of culture and politics than
in any promise of restraint through something called “originalism.”
Let me conclude by providing a different vision of judicial review
than the application of principles that were somehow put into the
Constitution to some contemporary problem. Once judicial review takes
hold, the Constitution functions as the starting point for a process, not as
a set of directions—an “instruction manual,” as some originalists would
have it.107 Once set in motion, a good part of its life—just like yours and
mine—is defined by what happened yesterday. And just like your life
and mine, the process must adjust to what has happened around it. I
often find myself yearning for more clear cut answers to the problems
that life throws up. But wishing does not make them available. And so
it is with the United States Constitution. It can solve some things pretty
cleanly, like how old a presidential candidate must be. But with most of
the interesting things it leaves us to struggle.
This is so even when there are words to provide a measure of
guidance. Those words can easily mislead. Not even the words of
instruction manuals fill up all the spaces for machines or chemical
processes they typically instruct about. But the Constitution is not in
many of its provisions anything like an instruction manual, and American
democracy is not much like a machine either. We must struggle with the
problems that the intersection of the Constitution and our democracy
throws our way. If judges are doing the struggling and they take the
originalist approach seriously, they will much more often than not come
up empty. A good part of the resources they will then employ will be
values to which they can relate today. If that is what it means for our
Constitution to be a living one, then a living Constitution is inevitable.

107.
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Or a “blueprint.” See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 6, at 52.

